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It’s all about what you do

Kevin Stolarick

In the Spring of 2001, I sat in
Richard Florida’s kitchen poring over
a list with him. “Yes, no, no, obviously,
…, of course, nope, nada, none of
those, don’t think so, …, Yes, what
do you think? …” Item by item, we
looked through the Bureau of Labor
Statistic’s Standard Occupational
Codes’ occupation titles and identified
the creative class. We already knew
about knowledge workers and
human capital, but we were looking
for something else. We were looking
for people who were being paid to
think. We called them the creative
class because creativity implies action
– it’s something that you do – not just
a characteristic, like education that
you happen to possess. We preferred
creative over knowledge because
knowledge, too, implied something
static and had so often been conflated
with “white collar” that we needed
something new. And, knowledge
workers didn’t really include many
of the artists, designers, and others
whose work included the pure creative
and innovative products that were
the hallmark of the new economy we
wanted to describe.
Florida’s The Rise of the Creative
Class was released in 2002 and gained
a popularity that continues to grow.
Measures like “creativity index” and
“gay index” and “melting pot index”,
especially being applied to individual
regions, garnered both practitioner and
media attention. In Florida’s modern
creative economy, knowledge and
innovation are the key. Those who
generate those advances are both
more mobile and more demanding
of the place they are willing to call

home. Countries, states, and regions
need to compete for talent at least as
much as they have been competing to
attract firms and industries. Today’s
economy is driven by creativity, and
the holders of that creativity or “the
creative class” drive regional prosperity
(Florida, 2002).
We are living not only in a
knowledge-based, but in a creative
economy. Today, more people than
ever before are being paid to think. In
the developed world, these creative
workers earn roughly half of all wages
that are being paid. Their creativity
is generating innovations that are
driving the economy – innovations in
technology, in design, in production
processes, in service provision. These
innovations are a precondition for
increases in productivity, economic
growth and thus ultimately a
society’s prosperity. The creative
workers, however, have become a
highly mobile economic resource
and in fact the Creative Class tends
to cluster in a relatively small number
of metropolitan areas, or creative
hot-spots around the world – such
as Greater London, Ile de France or
Silicon Valley. The ability to attract and
retain these members of the creative
class has become a major determinant
of competitiveness for countries and
regions.

human being has the potential to be
creative. The creative class, however,
consists of people who are paid to
think or to apply their talents to a
specific task. It can be divided into
two components, the “super creative
core”, or those workers whose output is
completely dependent on intellectual
activity, and “creative professionals”,
whose work is primarily related
to intellectual activity but closely
associated with a specific domain.
(Definition based on work the author
completed with Florida).
Based on these definitions just
over 30 percent of the total U.S.
workforce would belong to the
creative class. The “working class”,
which includes construction, trades,
and manufacturing, accounts for
approximately 24 percent, and the
“service class”, which are typically lowwage, service-oriented jobs, comprises
the remaining 45 percent. This
implies that about 40 million people
in the United States work in creative

occupations. While that accounts for
less than a third of the workforce, the
creative class earns almost half of the
total wages being paid.
These broad calculations are based
on occupational categories and
therefore inclusion in the creative class
is based on current paid activity rather
than on any individual characteristic
like educational attainment. The super
creative core includes occupations
such as architects and engineers,
artists and designers, computer
and mathematical occupations or
educators. The creative professionals
are, for example, those working in
management, business and finance,
law or certain segments of the
health care industry (e.g. doctors).
Not everyone in those occupations
is necessarily creative and there are
obviously creative people in other
occupational categories. Nonetheless,
these labor force statistics permit for
some rough estimates about the size
of the Creative Class.

Defining and Measuring the
Creative Class
The Creative Class can broadly be
defined as comprising those workers
whose productive output depends
on thinking rather than doing. Every
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Figure 2 shows the relationship
between the creative class and
the super creative core for the 61
metropolitan areas in the U.S. with
a population above one million. Not
unexpectedly, those places that have
a high concentration of one generally
have a high concentration of the
other. The two measures are strongly
correlated, but the correlation is not
perfect. In Las Vegas, for instance, the
difference between the two is about
13.6% (creative class: 18.5%; creative
core: 4.9%). In Washington DC, the
creative class even outnumbers the
super creative core by over 24%
(creative: 41%; creative core: 16.9%).
For the 61 regions, on average, adding
the creative professionals to the super
creative core adds another 19% of the
total workforce to the creative class.
Both the super creative core and the
creative professionals are unevenly
distributed across the country and
around the world and, while related,
a high concentration of one does not
guarantee a high concentration of the
other.
Figure 3 shows the relationship

between the creative class and the more
traditional measure of human capital,
the percentage of college graduates.
Although closely related with
traditional human capital measures
such as number of academics, the
creative class is a better measure of
the “talent in use”. First, by being based
on current occupation rather than
former training, the creative class is
capturing more recent information
about the state of talent in a region.
Second, it only includes those on
whose work a market value is placed
(i.e. a salary). College graduates may
be underemployed while those without
an academic degree may be doing
highly qualified work. As university
drop-outs Bill Gates, Steve Jobs and
Michael Dell would be excluded from
traditional human capital measures,
even though they are icons of the
creative economy.
The Creative Class is drawn to cities
and larger urban areas. Figure 4 shows
the relationship between the share of
a city region’s workforce that is in the
Creative Class and the total population
of the region (logged). As cities get

larger, not only does their Creative
Class grow larger at the same pace as
the rest of the population – the Creative
Class grows even larger. Many potential
explanations have been offered, but
nothing has clearly demonstrated the
underlying mechanism and causality
at work. Clearly, larger urban centers
have more than their “fair share”
of Creative Class workers. Many of
whom have moved to those regions

from elsewhere. And, while having
an employment opportunity used to
be the only thing needed to attract
someone to a region, it is clearly no
longer enough. Other factors like
creative agglomeration effects and
regional amenities have become
important factors in creating growing
and prosperous regions in today’s
Creative Economy. Human capital can
no longer be measured simply as a fixed

the same trend can be observed in
other developed economies.

Occupational and Industry
Clusters

Figure 4

“stock” or “endowment” that region
possesses – instead it must be seen
as a “flow” that moves from place to
place as the individuals who own their
human capital find the region that best
meets their current needs.
The various creative professions
can be grouped into four broad
categories that can be remembered
by the mnemonic T-A-P-E: Technology
and Innovation, Arts and Culture,
P rofessional and Managerial ,
Education and Training. Figure 5 shows
the (2006) composition of the creative
class in the U.S. The largest numbers
of individuals are in Education and
Health care while the greatest total
salaries are paid to Managers and
Health care practitioners.
Figure 6 shows the change in
the creative, service, working, and
agricultural classes in the U.S. from
1900 to 2006 and the estimates through
2020. The creative class has grown from

about four million in 1900 to over 40
million today, and is expected to count
over 50 million a decade from now. The
creative, service and working classes
continue to grow in absolute terms.
The anticipated growth rate between
now and 2020, however, is larger for the
creative class (20%) than the service
class (14%) and working class (10%).
Figure 7, illustrates the changing
composition of the U.S. workforce and
the continued transformation towards
a creative economy. While the relative
shares of the agricultural and working
classes continue to decline, the service
class share will remain fairly stable.
The share of the U.S. workforce in the
creative class, however, continues to
grow. These projections are based on
estimates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The fastest growing creative
occupations are in computer and
health care while the largest number
of new jobs will be added in education
and health care. Generally speaking,

Over the last 50 years, geographers
and economists have come a long
way from attributing regional growth
primarily to exports and trade. Solow
(1956) noted the effect of technology
on economic growth. Ullman (1958)
noted the role of human capital in his
work on regional development. Jacobs
(1961, 1969) emphasized the role of
cities and regions in the transfer and
diffusion of knowledge; as the scale
and diversity of cities increase, so do
the connections between economic
actors that result in the generation of
new ideas and innovations. Romer’s
(1986, 1987, 1990) endogenous growth
model connected technology to human
capital, knowledge, and economic
growth. Invention in the neoclassical
framework was no longer exogenous,
but a purposeful activity demanding
real resources. Lucas (1988) further
developed and explicitly identified
the role of human capital externalities
in economic development. Building
on Jacobs’ and Romer’s work, Lucas
(1988) highlighted the clustering effect
of human capital, which embodies
the knowledge factor. He recognized
the role of great cities, which localize
human capital and information, create
knowledge spill overs, and become
engines of economic growth. Cities
reduce the cost of knowledge transfer,
so ideas move more quickly, in turn
giving rise to new knowledge more
quickly.

It is now widely recognized that
regional competitiveness and growth
depends largely on the concentration
of skills, innovations and the systemic
linkages between firms, institutions
and people (i.e. clusters). Cultivating
such regional ecosystems of economic
actors has become the cornerstone
of regional and national economic
development strategies. A seminal
work in this regard has been Porter’s
(1998) analysis of industrial clustering,
where he outlined the dense linkages
across industries that generate new
products and encourage the exchange
of ideas. While newfangled in its
approach, the importance of clustering
was already formalized some 100 years
ago by Alfred Marshal (1890) in his
discussion of “industrial districts”
that possess something “in the air”
sparking perpetual innovation and
productivity. Indeed, as Porter argues,
regional economic growth cannot
be attributed to the mere sum of
individual economic activities but also
to synergies between firms, knowledgespillover, supply-chain linkages and
other clustering effects.
The clustering of members of the
creative class is not only important
for regional growth because their raw
labor is a factor of production. More
importantly they increase productivity
because of the human capital they
hold. Hence, more recent productivity
measures take into account a region’s
human capital stock. Florida’s (2002)
“creative class” and Glaeser’s (2003)
“skilled city” focus on the talent or
supply contributions to regional
growth. While Porter’s earlier industrybased model focuses on the demand
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side of the labor market, these more
recent contributions focus on the
supply that makes such industrial
growth possible. After all, skilled
and creative individuals are a highly
mobile resource and thus the factors
determining the supply-side are critical
for economic development. What is
driving these clusters is not only the
industry, but also the people and their
skills and occupations.
Understanding a regional economy
only from an industry perspective or
only from an occupational perspective
does not provide a comprehensive
analysis of local economic dynamics.
This analysis, which jointly considers
the distribution of occupations
within industry and industries
across occupations, provides deeper
insight into a regional economy with
possibilities for how such results could
aid in more nuanced place and skill
specific development and industrial

policy.
Across the U.S. in 2000, the
Information Technology Industry
accounted for approximately 2.0
million full-time employees, about
1.8% of the total workforce. However,
at exactly the same time, Information
Technology Occupations accounted
for 3.4 million full-time employees,
about 2.8% of the total workforce. The
occupational number was actually
even higher since the industry count
includes the self-employed while the
occupational data excludes the selfemployed. Clearly, the IT industry
and the IT occupations are not the
same thing. The latter provides a broad
skill base to multiple industries. Using
Census PUMS data which includes
both industry and occupation for
individuals, we find that over 50% of
those working in an IT occupation
are not working in the IT industry.
And, over 25% of those working in

the IT industry are not working in
an IT occupation. Not quite one-infour people working in either the IT
industry or an IT occupation actually
are in an IT occupation at a company
that is in the IT industry.
While only a single industry and
occupation was specifically addressed
by this analysis, it is worth noting
several things. First, this particular
industry and occupation combination
is one that has been the continued
focus of much economic development
activity. Second, across the entire
U.S. the IT industry employs people
in 337 (of 509 unique) occupational
code groups. . And, for the U.S. IT
occupations show up in 243 (of 266
unique) industry code groups. While
only a “single” cluster, it is clear from
these results that with only 11 IT
occupations and 5 IT industries, 326
non-IT occupations and 238 nonIT industries cross-fertilize in some
capacity with IT, using IT skills in nonIT industries. Yet this nuance would
not be picked up by employing either
occupational or industrial analysis.
This technique could easily be used to

Figure 6

understand numerous other industry
and occupational clusters.
By linking o ccupation and
industry, this analysis helps to
develop an understanding that is
especially important in today’s global
economy. It is no longer sufficient to
evaluate a region’s manufacturing
base and potential for outsourcing,
off-shoring, or global competition
solely on the basis of industry. The
occupational mix must also be taken
into consideration. For example, Los
Angeles has significant employment in
the automotive industry. But, no one
who understands that industry in Los
Angeles would argue that it is the same
as Flint, Michigan or Oshawa, Ontario.
By also looking at the occupational
mix, it becomes clear that many of Los
Angeles’s “auto workers” are designers
and programmers -- not assembly
line workers. In the same way, much
of Detroit’s automotive employment
has shifted from significant shares in
manufacturing occupations to people
working in management, accounting,
marketing, etc. The transition from
manufacturing employment that is still

based on people actually assembling
products to advanced manufacturing
or manufacturing employment based
mostly on “home office” activities can
only be discovered and understood by
looking at the occupational mix within
the specific manufacturing industries.
If the actual manufacturing activities
have already been moved to lower
cost labor markets, the remaining
“manufacturing industry” employment
is more likely to be the higher value,
more highly paid occupations that
are less likely to move and are more
difficult to transition out of the region
simply based on lower labor costs. Just
evaluating on employment within
the industry without taking into
consideration the mix of occupations
will not reveal a meaningful picture
of the situation. These distinctions
are enormous when in the process of
policy making targeting a particular
industry. Car manufacturing tax breaks
would no more help Los Angeles than
art and design school subsidies would
help Flint, Michigan. And yet, from a
macro perspective, both regions would
be prime targets for auto production
industrial policy. The geographical
distinctions in the production process
and its vast implications for growth
has been seminally documented by
Massey (1984).
This analysis points to another
important component of current
economic development strategy.
Because firms go where skills are,
being aware of both the industries
and the skills that drive regional
development presents possibilities
for other types of industry growth
– particularly when the tides of
globalization and innovation can
change competitive advantage at
a rapid pace. Skill strengths allow a
region to seek out new opportunities
and industry attraction outside of their
primary cluster, a point that Jacobs
(1969) made long ago. We speculate
that our results may contribute to job
training and educational attainment
policies aimed at creating a local skill
base that can be used in a variety of

different industries.

Why it’s all about what you do
As our economy changed from
deriving value from making and
doing to thinking and designing, a
whole lot of underlying structures
and assumptions have changed with
it. It’s not about having accessible
transportation or ready access to
raw materials – today’s successful
regions are the ones that can attract
and retain the raw material of the
Creative Age – talented, highly skilled
people. And, those skills are easily
transferred among a collection of
different industries. Regions can no
longer find success from attracting a
steel mill or a car plant. Instead, they
need to attract Research Scientists,
Computer Programmers, and Graphic
Designers.
Over the past few decades,
people had already internalized this
transition without notice or remark.
Introductions at cocktail parties or
over coffee switched from talking
about where you work to what you do.
People increasingly focused on their
occupation and decreasingly talked
about their company or industry. Partly
this came about from the transition
away from the lifetime employment
model where a single employer
would hire someone “from cradle to
grave”. Related was the increase in
contingent and independent contract
and consulting based work. Individuals
were no longer employed – they got
a short term contract. While partly
a cost-saving measure on the part
of savvy employers, this was also a
response to the risk associated with
rapidly changing technologies and a
fickle customer base. When everything
is a trial product, employers don’t
need to lock-in skills for years – they
just need specific skills for the next
few months. Whatever the causes,
the shifting economy resulted in
occupation becoming much more
prominent than it had been in the
past.

Since “Oz” i s primarily an
architecture journal, and I’m more of
an economic geographer or regional
scientist (what I do), I probably should
say something about architecture.
Well, I won’t. You’re smart people;
you’re part of the Creative Class;
you’re the ones who are going to
give physical form to these new
(predominately urban) spaces that will
be inhabited increasingly by people
focused on what they are doing rather
than firms focused on what they are
making. I’ve given you the story. I’ve
outlined its history and talked about
the significant changes and the new
foci of the Creative Economy. Now,
it’s your turn. It’s all about what you
do…
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